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ABSTRACT
The paper examines the prospects for the developm ent of theoretically reflexive theory in the discipline of
international rela tions.  First, the issue of theoretical reflexivity is discussed in terms of the "reflexive turn" associated
with  post-positivist philosophy of science in contempo rary socia l and  politica l theory.  The  question o f whether a
parallel to the "reflexive turn" in social and political theory can be identified in  theorizing about international relations
is then addressed.  It is argued that in the context of international relations theory's Third Debate one sees evidence
of the growth of the "broader and deeper kind of po litical and epistemological self-consciousness" which is
fundamental to the development of a theoretically reflexive disposition.  As a consequence, if it remains prem ature
to speak of an authentic "reflexive turn" in the discipline of international relations, it can nonetheless be argued that
the prospects for the grow th of theoretically reflexive  interna tional relations theory are real and significant, while the
need for such  theory is urgent.
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2     1 This applies as well to the study of international society, ie. international relations theory. For
a discussion of the predominance of positivism in international relations theory, see Olson and
Onuf (1985).
     2 Lakatos' "methodology of scientific research programmes" is the most recent reformulation
of the positivist tradition. Because of its current popularity among international relations theorists,
it bears special mention. The central distinctions between Lakatos' formulation and that of his
teacher, Karl Popper, are i) Lakatos' rejection of Popper's "strict falsificationism", ii) his shift of
emphasis from individual statements to meta-theoretical units, ie. "research programmes" as the
Introduction
Increasingly over the last decade calls have been heard  for a fundamental " restructu ring" of international
relations theory (Cox, 1981; Ashley, 1987; Hoffman; 1987).  Moreover, it has been argued that a key part of the
movement "beyond in ternational rela tions theory"  - conventionally defined - is the  recogn ition that:
Theory is always for someone and for som e purpose  . . .  There is  . . .  no such thing as theo ry in
itself, divorced from a standpoin t in time and  space (Co x, 1981: 128).
A restructured international relations theory which incorporates this recognition into the process of theorizing would,
as a consequence, strive to be
more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself: to become clearly aware of the perspective
which gives rise to theorizing, and its relations to other perspectives (to achieve a perspective on
perspectives)  . . .  (Cox, 1981:128)
In short, a restructured international relations theory would be distinguished by "theoretical reflexivity".
It is the objective of this paper to explore the prospects for the growth of theoretically reflexive theory w ithin
the discipline of international relations as we enter a new decade.  To that end, I will proceed as follows.  First, an
explanation will be advanced to account for the traditional lack of theoretica l reflexivity in  social sc ience  in general -
and by extension , in the discipline of interna tional relations.  I will then review briefly recent developments in the
philosophy of science which have opened the doo r to increased  theoretical reflex ivity.  Finally, I w ill return to the
discipline of international relations to examine to what degree the "reflexive turn" in social and political theory more
generally is parallelled in theorizing about international politics.  It will be argued that, notwithstanding the fact that
"[f]or many years the international relations discipline has had the dubious honour of being am ong the least self-
reflexive of the Western social sciences" (Lapid,1989:249-50), the prospects for the development of theoretically
reflexive  interna tional relations theory are real and sign ificant, while the need for such  theory is urgent.
PART I: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AN D THEOR ETICAL REFLEXIVITY
That we disavow reflection is positivism.      Jürgen H abermas (1971:v ii)
Truth as Correspondence and Theoretical Reflexivity
Traditionally, theore tica l ref lexivity  has been lacking in the  soc ial sciences.  This lack can be explained in
terms of the predom inance of the positivist approach to the study of society.1  
Specifically, it is the positivist tenet o f "truth as correspond ence" - and its underlying assumption of the separation
of subject and object - which has inhibited theoretical reflexivity.
The tenet o f "truth as correspond ence" has stood  as one of the core  tenets o f the positivist tradition
throughout its history - from August Com te, to the Vienna Circle, to the con temporary reform ulations of positivism
offered by Karl Popp er and, m ost recently, Imre Lakatos2.  That is, positivism stipulates that theoretical explanations
3proper concern of the philosophy of science, and iii) his advocacy of tolerance of theoretical
pluralism. Nonetheless, Lakatos' "sophisticated methodological falsificationism", like Popper's
"methodological falsificationism" before it, continues to uphold the core tenets of the positivist
logic of investigation: namely, i) value-freedom in scientific knowledge, ii) the methodological
unity of science, and, most importantly in terms of the concerns of this paper, iii) the
correspondence theory of truth.
will be true  to the extent that they accurately reflec t reality; to the  extent that they correspond to  the fac ts.  This tenet,
in turn, rests upon a particular assumption: that of the separation of subject and object, of observer and observed.
In other words, the tenet of "truth as correspondence" assumes that through the  proper app lication  of research design
and techniques, the researcher(s) can be "factored out", leaving behind a description of the world "as it truly is".  In
short, the tenet of "truth  as correspondence" is the expression of the  goal of rendering science  a "process w ithou t a
subject".
The consequence of this tenet and of this assumption is that a number of problematic issues are swept aside.
In making the separation of subject and object a defining condition of science, the positivist approach ignores the
active and vital role  played by the co mmunity o f researchers in the production and  valida tion of know ledge.  It
ignores the fact that the standards which define "reliable know ledge" are dependent upon their acceptance and
application by a research com munity.  
As a result, a number of important questions not only go unanswered - they are never raised.  They include
questions of the historical origin and nature of the comm unity-based standards which define what counts as reliable
knowledge, as well as the question o f the m erits of those standards in the light of possib le alternatives.  These
questions do not arise in a positivist-insp ired theorizing because the central stan dard  of scientific truth  - that of tru th
as correspondence - is seen to belong not to a time-bound hum an co m munity of scientific investigators, but to an
extra-historical natural realm .  In  short, th e knowledge-defining standard  of positivism  is understood to  be "N ature 's
own" (Rorty, 1982: xxvi).
Thus it is that the positivist tenet of "tru th as co rrespondence", based  as it is o n th e assu m ption of the
separation of subject and object, effectively forecloses theoretical reflexivity.  For the question of the origin, nature,
and merits of "reliable knowledge" in a given context and for a given research er/ research community  is centra l to
the agenda of theoretical reflexivity.  It is these issues which serve as the  focal po int of the on -going process of
"theo retical reflection on the process o f theorizing itself".  Since positivism conceptualizes science as a "process
without a subject", and views the standards for assessing truth cla ims as those of nature itself , it becom es virtually
impossible to reflect either upon the role of the scientific comm unity in adopting and reproducing the standards which
define reliable knowledge, or on the m erits of those knowledge-defining standards.
It follows, then, that if an element of theoretical reflexivity is to be incorporated into social science, the
positivist tenet o f "truth as correspond ence" m ust be  challenged .  And  it is precisely  such  a cha llenge that has been
raised within contemporary social and political theory - and within the philosophy of science in particular - by way
of a re-examination of the underlying assumption of the separation of subject and object.  It is to a review of that
scholarship that we now turn.
Post-Positivist Philosophy of Science and the Opening to Theoretical Reflexivity
One of the impetuses to the development of a post-positivist philosophy of science - and to the "reflexive
turn" associated with it - was the work of  Thomas Kuhn.  In particular, it was Kuhn's thesis of the
4"incom mensurability" of contending paradigms that marked a clear break w ith positivist form ulation s.  Kuh n's basic
account of the m ovem ent of ma ture sciences through a cycle of 
norm al science -> c risis -> revolution  -> new norm al science ->
is well known and need not be repeated here (Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970; Chalmers, 1982).  But
because it is on the  understand ing of K uhn 's notion of incom mensurability that so much disagreement rests, and
because  of its cen trality for theoretica l reflexivity, let us review  in m ore detail the exact m eaning of the term .
Incommensurability, according to Kuhn, is a defining feature of paradigmatically-defined normal science.
In Kuhn's words, "The normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible
but often actually incomm ensurable with that which has gone befo re" (1970:103, em phasis added).  As Bernstein
notes, the best way to understand  what is meant by incom mensurability is to compare it to  the positivist understanding
of the structure of scientific explanation and theory .  Within this understanding, there is the assumption of a
"permanent neutral observation language" - achieved by means of the strict separation of subject and object - by
which we can evaluate rival theories/ research programmes.  It is through this permanent neutral observation language
that one  can d eterm ine the truth content of a given theory/ research programm e understood in terms of the degree of
correspondence to the "real world"; it is because of the permanent neutral observation language that one can know
that the standards applied are more than conventions - that the standards app lied are  "Na ture's own" (Bernstein , 1985).
It is this assumption of a neutral observation language that Kuhn's notion of incomm en-surability is meant
to challenge.  For it is Kuhn's argument that paradigms are not derived from em pirical ev idence; rather, parad igms
are social conventions whose function it is to determine what is to count as evidence.  Paradigms do not just provide
mod el solutions to significant problems: they define what are to count as significant problem s in the first place.  The
incommensurability of parad igms - literally, the absence of a common m easure - is an incomm ensurability of
meanings, problems and standards.  And it is for this reason, asserts Kuhn, that scientists working within rival
parad igms "practice their trades in different worlds" and, in some areas, even "see different things" (Bernstein,
198 5:82 ).  As a consequence, no  straight-forw ard appeal to evidence can be used either to support one theory over
another in the present (à la Popper) or even to explain the superiority of  one  research  program me over another in
retrospect (à la Lakatos).  Rather, the shift of allegiance from  one paradigm to another is, in Kuhn's terms, not a
function of evidence but of "persuasion"; not an instance of acquiescence in the face of demonstrable proof, but an
experience of "conversion".
It is interesting to no te that co ntem porary proponents of the positivist approach such as Popper and Lakatos
did recognize the "theory-laden" nature of all empirical evidence.  Indeed, it was in response to this recognition, and
the problems it posed for methodological falsificationism, that Popper reformulated the question of the reliability of
empirical evidence  in term s of public  obse rvation statements (a reformulation which Lakatos adopted in his  own
work).  Public obse rvation  statem ents, or "basic statem ents", argued Popp er, "are accepted as the result of a decision
or agreement, and to  tha t exten t they are co nventions" (1968:126).  
This is exactly Kuhn's point.  Public observation statements - statements of fact - are never anything but
parad igmatically-in formed social conventions.  An d this being the case , it is quite understan dab le that sc ientific
investigators working in terms of different paradigm-defined conventions might "see different things".
As a consequence, concludes Kuhn, "There is no neutral algorithm for theory choice, no systematic decision
procedure which , properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to the same dec ision"  (1970:200).  In short,
notes Bernstein, Kuhn "denies that there is a `third' completely neutral language or framework within which rival
paradigmatic theories `could be fully expressed and which could therefore be used in a point-by-point comparison
betw een them '" (1985 :85).
5The work of Thomas Kuhn, along with others such as Paul Feyeraben d (1975) and, m ost recently, Richard
Rorty (1979), have been key to the emergence of a post-positivist philosophy of science in which incommensurability
hold  a central place.  The central tenets of this post-positivist philosophy of science  are sum marized below by  Hesse
(1980:172-73):
i) In natural science data is not detachable from theory, for what count as data are determined in the
light of some theoretical interpretation, and the facts them selves have to be reconstructed in the
light of interpretation.
ii) In natural science theories are  not m ode ls externally compared to nature in a hypothetico-deductive
schema, they are the way the facts themselves are seen.
iii) In natural science the lawlike relations asserted of experience are internal, because what counts as
facts are  constituted b y wh at the theory says about their inter-relations with one ano ther.
iv) The language of natural science is irreducibly metaphorical and inexact, and formalizable only at
the cost of distortion of the historica l dynam ics of sc ientific  developm ent and of the imaginative
constructions in terms of which nature is interpreted by science.
v) Meanings in natural science are determined by theory; they are understood by theoretical coherence
rather than by  correspondence with fac ts.
In short, post-positivist philosophy  of science  affirm s that all scientific inq uiry - natural science and, by
extension, social sc ience  as well - involves interpretation of  theory-laden  evidence  by m eans of incom mensurable
theoretical fram eworks w hich  are themselves never other than social conventions adopted by a community of
investigators.  The post-positivist philosophy of science breaks the link with the positivist tenet of "truth as
correspondence" by underscoring the central role o f the "su bject"  - the community  of investigators - in constituting
the  "object"  - the  wo rld around us.  It is th rough this  break tha t a space fo r theore tica l ref lexivity  is created .  
It is important to note, however, that although incommensurab ility as encapsulated  within post-positivist
philosophy of science provides an opening for the development of theoretical reflexivity, the acceptance of the notion
of incommensurability does not automatically result in a reflexive disposition.  The prob lem  lies in the tendency to
equate incomm ensurability of paradigms with the incomparability of parad igms.  To grasp this better, let us re turn
to Kuhn 's work.
Kuhn's willingness to take the recognition of the paradigmatically-determined nature of all evidence to its
logical conclusion has made him  the object of attack by positivists such as Popper.  Popper (1970:56) accuses Kuhn
of prom oting the "M yth of the Framework" according to which "we are prisoners caught in the framework of our
theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our language," and that as a consequence we cann ot communicate
with or judge  those w orking in te rms of  a diffe ren t paradigm .  
If it is true that the incommensurab ility of paradigms means that attem pts at inter-paradigm atic
comm unication are futile, and that reasoned judgements ab out the relative w orth of rival paradigm s are impossible,
then the notion of incommensurability is as much an obstacle to theoretical reflexivity as is that of "truth as
correspondence".  For it is the underlying premise of theoretical reflexivity (as found in the tradition of critical
theorizing) that ration al reflection and reaso ned  judgements ab out the relative m erits of paradigm -specific
conventions which define what is to count as reliable knowledge are possible - and indeed, indispensable.
In fact, it is not a t all necessary to equate incommensurability with the incomparability as implied by
Popper's "Myth  of the Fram ework".  As Bernstein notes,
 . . .  Kuhn did no t introduce the incomm ensurability thesis in order to call into the question the
possibility of comparing theories and rationally evaluating them, but to clarify what we are doing
when w e com pare [ incommensurable] theories (1985 :86).
6To understand what we are doing when we compare the incommensurable, it is necessary to see how both
the positivist insistence on "truth as correspondence" - as well as Popper's notion of the "M yth of the Framew ork" -
are expressions of a comm on philosophical apprehension.  They are both expressions of what Bernstein has termed
the "Cartesian anxiety" - the notion, central to the thought of René Descartes, that should we prove unsuccessful in
our search for the Archimedean point of indubitable knowledge which can serve as the foundation for human reason,
then rationa lity must give w ay to irrationality, and reliab le knowledge to  madness.  No tes Bernstein  in his review of
the work of the "father of modern philosophy",
With a chilling clarity Descartes leads  us with an apparent and ineluctable necessity to a grand and
seductive Either/Or.  Either there is  some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our
knowledge, or we cann ot escape the forces of darkness that envelop  us with m adness, with
intellectual and m oral chaos (1985 :86).
It should be noted that the Cartesian anxiety, which has served as the driving force of modern philosophy -
and which is reflected in  positivism 's insistence on  the ah istorical, extra-social standard of "truth as correspondence" -
is bound up with the conception of knowledge that Aristotle called episteme: apodictic knowledge of the order and
nature of the co sm os.  
The pecu liarly modern fear that the  undermining of the viability of episteme must lead  inexorably to
irrationality and chaos is itself, it can be argued, the result of the limiting of the modern conception of knowledge and
rationa lity to episteme.  What is particularly  noteworthy is tha t classical conceptions of  knowledge w ere conside rably
broader.  In addition to the conception of know ledge known as episteme, Aristotle also spoke of a form of knowledge
he termed phronesis: a form  of "practical reason" orien ted toward the p rudent exercise of  judgement in  con texts
characterized by the contingent and  variable.  And since the political realm, in the classical conception, had such a
character, the practice of phronesis was considered indispensable to the goal of leading a good and just life in the
polis .
What is particularly interesting, is that although the classical conception of phronesis has been all but lost
as a form ally recognized  category of knowledge in  the m odern period , the core traits of this k ind o f knowledge are
clearly recognizable in the attempts to articulate a post-positivist philosophy of science.  As Bernstein notes in a
com parison of  the work of Kuhn to  that of  the classically-oriented  philosopher Hans-G eorg Gadamer,
 . . .  the type of rationality that Kuhn has been struggling to articulate when dealing with the
complex issues o f theory-cho ice and paradigm  switch es - his ins istence  that reasons function as
values which can be differently weighted and applied to concrete situations, and his defence of the
role of judgement in making choices and decisions - are closely related to Gadamer's analysis of
phronesis  . . .  There is a groping quality in Kuhn's several attempts to clarify the characteristics
of the  type of argum entatio n that is  involved in choosing am ong riva l paradigm s.  It is as if he has
been search ing for a  proper mode l to express his awareness that such delibera tion and choo sing are
rational activities, but not the sort of rational ac tivity that has been characterized as deductive proof
or em pirical verification  or falsifica tion (1985 :40-41).
In short, argues Bernstein, "without being completely aware of what he is doing Kuhn is appealing to a conception
of rationality that has been at the core of the tradition of practical philosophy [phronesis]" (1985:41).
Thus what we  are do ing when  we com pare incommensurable paradigm s is refusing to limit our conception
of hum an reason to a mechanical application of an eternal, unchanging standard.  We are affirming that a broader and
more subtle conception of reason is possible than that which underlies both the positivist tenet of "truth as
correspondence" and that of rad ical rela tivism as the logica l consequence of incommensurability.  
7     3 Some authors refer to this conception of reason as a "dialogical" conception of reason. See,
for example, Cornell (1985).
When we com pare incom mensurable paradigm s we are participating in the revival of a neglected but potent
"prac tical" form  of reason - phronesis3 - which allows adherents of rival paradigms to comm unicate with each other
and to learn from o ne another's argumen ts, and which enab les us to  weigh the relative merits of rival paradigms by
comparing them with each other "in multiple ways without requiring the assumption that there is or must always be
a com mon, fixed grid by wh ich w e m easure progress" (Bernstein , 1985:86 ).
When we compare incommensurable paradigms we are recognizing that the  standards w e em ploy to judge
between paradigms - like those we use to judge between theories within a paradigm - are human standards which
are "made", and  not nature's standards w hich  are "given".  We are recogniz ing that there is no straight-forward way
of "keeping score" between rival paradigms (because incommensurable paradigms are, by definition, playing different
"gam es").  But we are also affirm ing that we can use our pow ers of reason to evaluate d ifferent "gam es", to
"persuade" others of the w ell-foundedness of our judgements, and thereby to "convert" others through a process of
reasoned debate  and argument to our poin t of  view.  
To com pare the incommensurable is to affirm that it is possible to provide "good reasons" for judging one
paradigm superior to another, even as we acknowledge that the standards for what counts as a "good reason" - and
by extension, fo r wh at con stitutes a "superior parad igm" - are themselves p roducts of hum an reasoning which  is
always historically contingent and context-dependent.
To com pare the incomm ensurable is not to abandon the realm of reliable knowledge for that of m adness;
it is to recognize that knowledge-defining standards are  always open to  question and to  reassessment.  In short, to
com pare the incommensurable is to engage in theoretical reflexivity.
Conclusion to Part I
The dissolution of the positivist tenet of "truth as correspondence" (through the undermining of the
underlying assumption of the separation of subject and object) has brought the issue of theoretica l reflexivity to  centre
stage in contemporary social and political theory.  And the recovery of a  lost conception  of reason - phronesis - by
socia l and  politica l theorists provides a m eans by w hich  the practice o f theoretical reflex ivity may be  justified  in a
context dom inated by  the "Cartesian anxiety".  The question  remains, however, to what extent this "reflexive turn"
in social and political theory more generally has its counterpart in the discipline of international relations? It is to that
question that we now turn.
PART II: REFLEXIVITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
The "personal equation" of the politica l scientist both limits and directs h is scholarly
pursuits.  The truth which a mind thus socially conditioned is able to grasp is likewise socially
conditioned.  The perspective of the observer determines what can be known and how it is to be
understood.           
                                                                    Hans J.  Morgenthau (1959:21)
Introduction
In the first part of this paper, we examined the question of theoretical reflexivity in terms of social and
political theory.  We noted the important contribution of post-positivist philosophy of science which, by underscoring
8the central role played by the comm unity of inquirers (the subject) in constituting their subject matter (the object),
challenges the positivist tenet of "truth as correspondence".  This recognition, combined with a form of reason
(phronesis) suited to the com parison of incom mensurable knowledge-defining standards which are paradigm-specific,
creates ENDFIELD 
a space for critical reflection on those standards - in short, for theoretical reflexivity.
The question remains, how ever, to what degree the "reflexive turn" in  social and  political theory has a
parallel in international relations theory.  To what extent has a space for theoretical reflexivity been created in the
discipline of international relations?
I will attempt to an swer this questions by exploring the issue of theoretical reflexivity in international
relations theory through a recently arisen meta-theoretical debate in the discipline - international relations theory's
"Third Deba te".
International Relations Theory's "Third Debate"
To understand the significance of the Third D ebate for the  discip line of international relations, it is necessa ry
to place it in context.  The contemporary debate, which dates from the late 1980s, can be seen as the third in a series
of "discipline-defining" debates (Lapid, 1989:236) in the twentieth century: the first being that between "idealism "
and "realism " in the  1940s and 50s (Carr, 1939), with the second, which occurred during the 1960s, centring around
the confron tation b etween "history" and "science" (Knorr and  Rosenau, 1969).
One shou ld also  see the  Third Debate in term s of contem porary developments in the realm of social and
political theory m ore  generally.  It has been suggested  that the  claim  that "International Relations is a discrete area
of action and discourse, separate from social and political theory", can no longer be sustained  (Hoffm an, 1987:231).
Nowhere is there better evidence  for this position than in international relations theory's "Third Debate".  In short,
the rise of the  Third Debate can  be understood  as international relations theory's response to co ntem porary
developments in  soc ial and  political theory m ore  generally, and  in the philosophy of science in  particu lar.  
There is no question tha t the Third D ebate reflects the  genera l emphases shared by both contem porary
positivist and post-positivist philosophy of science.  Like the debates which preceded it, the Third Debate is part of
the search  for be tter theory.  In the case of the Th ird Debate, however, and in line with contemporary philosophy of
science, this search is being conducted not in terms of individual propositions or hypotheses, but in terms of larger
conceptual schem es.  The Third Debate is a "discourse about choice o f ana lytic fram eworks . . ." (Banks, 1985:20 ).
It involves a focus on  "meta-scien tific units" (ie.  on paradigm s), where particu lar attention is direc ted to  examining
the  "underly ing premises and assumptions" o f the paradigms in contention  (Lapid , 1989:239).  
A good example of this approach to the on-going quest for better theory is the work of M ichae l Ban ks.  In
an important contribution to the Third Debate, Banks conceptualizes the present state of the discipline in terms of
three contending parad igms: realism , pluralism, and structuralism.  "The debate about their respective merits," argues
Banks, "occupies centre stage in the 
discip line . . ."(1985:9).
Banks attempts to detail and  contrast the "basic images"  of the respec tive paradigm s.  Notes Banks:
Each of the three starts with a wholly different basic image.  For realists, the wo rld society is a
system of "billiard-ball" states in intermittent collision.  For pluralists, it is a "cobweb", a network
of numerous criss-crossing relationships.  For structuralists, it is a "multi-headed octopus", with
powerful tentacles constantly sucking wealth from the weakened peripheries towards the powerful
centres (198 5:12 ).
9     4 Apart from disagreeing on the content and labels of contending paradigms, authors also
disagree on the issue of the number of relevant paradigms, some identifying many more than three.
Three does seem to be the most common number, however, and in this regard Banks is once again
representative.
     It is interesting to note that the practice of conceptualizing the discipline as a set of contending
paradigms extends to the non-English speaking academic community as well. For examples from
Francophone international relations, see Huntzinger (1987) and Korany (1987).
     5 Similarly, in his overview of the sub-field of international political economy, Gilpin (1987)
speaks in terms of the "Nationalist", "Liberal" and "Marxist" perspectives.
It is these contrasting im ages, no tes Banks, that serve  as the fo und ation  for the erection of theoretical
structures.  These structures, while internally coherent, contradict one another in terms of major theoretical categories
including i) actors, ii) dynam ics, iii) dependent variab les, iv) subject boundaries, and v) spec ific concep ts.
With regard to  actors , notes Banks, "  . . .  realists see only states; pluralists see states in combina tion w ith
a great varie ty of others; and  structuralis ts see classes" .  As regards dynamics, "realists see fo rce as p rimary;
pluralists see com plex social m ovem ents; structuralists see economics".  As concerns dependent variables,
realists see the task of IR [in ternational rela tions] as simply to explain  what states do; plu ralists see
it more grandly as an effo rt to explain all major world events; and structuralists see its function as
showing why the w orld co ntains such  appalling contrasts between rich and poor (1985:12-13).
With regard to subject bo undaries,
Realists define the boun daries o f their subject in  a narrow, state-centric fashion, often preferring
the term "international politics" to describe it.  Pluralists widen the boundaries by including
multinational com panies, markets, ethnic grou ps and na tionalism as well as state behaviou r, and
call their subject IR or world society.  Structuralists have the widest boundaries of all, stressing the
unity  of the whole world system at all levels, focusing on modes of production and treating inter-
state po litics as m erely a su rface phenom enon (Banks, 1985:13 ).
And fina lly, as regards sp ecific concepts, Banks notes that:
Some concepts are fou nd only in one paradigm , becau se they  are of c rucial im portance  to it:
deterrence and alliances in realism, ethnicity and interdependence in pluralism, exploitation and
dependency in structuralism.  Others, however, are used with broadly similar meanings in a ll three:
pow er, sovereignty, and law, for example.  Yet others, like imperialism, the state, and hegemony,
are used in a ll three but with sharply different in terpretations (1985:13).
It is clear there is much room  for disagreem ent with  the specifics o f Banks' intervention .  His
conceptualization of the  con tending paradigm s - from  their basic im ages through to their contrasting notions of actors,
dynamics, etc .  - can be challenged as to its accuracy and adequacy.  Indeed, disagreements may extend all the way
to the labels used to designate contending parad igms.4  In contrast to Banks' use of the term s "realism", "pluralism "
and "structuralism", for example, Kal Ho lsti (1985) prefers those of the "Classical Tradition", "Global Society", and
"Neo-Marxism"; Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi (1987) employ those of "realism", "pluralism", and "globalism"; R.
D. McK inlay and R . Little (1986) identify their paradigms by the labels of "realist", "liberal" and "socialist".5  The
point remains, however, that Banks' work serves as an excellent example of how the emphases of contemporary
philosophy of science  have  spilled  over in to the  discip line of international relations, and influenced the form that
interventions have taken in the Third Debate.
 As was noted above, the Third Debate, like its forerunners, is a discip line-de fining debate; it is concerned,
as Banks notes, with the "search for better theory" (Lapid, 1989:237).  For that reason alone, it bears consideration.
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However, the Third Debate has special significance in term s of the  concerns  of this paper.  For beyond  the im mediate
argum ents about the  num ber, iden tifying characteristics , and appropriate labels for the paradigms in international
relations theory, the Third Debate affords a valuable opportunity for exploring the issue of theoretical reflex ivity in
the discipline.
It has been argued that international relations theory's Third Debate not only reflects the influence of
con tem porary philosop hy of science in general (ie.  the focus on m eta-theoretical units), but that it is a direct response
to post-positivist philosophy of science in particular.  In the words of Yosef Lapid, the Third Debate is "linked,
historica lly and  intellectually, to the  confluence of  diverse  anti-positivistic philosophical and sociological trends"
(1989:237).  In fact, as an ostensible response to post-positivist philosophy of science, the Third Debate has been
interpreted by som e as marking international relations theory's break with positivist orthodoxy.  M oreover, as a
consequence of its purported break with positivist orthodoxy and, specifically, with the positivist tenet of "truth as
correspondence", the Third Debate has been credited with contributing to an important increase in theoretical
reflexivity w ithin the discip line of international relations (Lapid, 198 9:249-50).
In the rem ainder of th is paper this interpretation of  the Third D ebate will be examined.  It will be argued that
to see the Third Debate as marking a conclusive break with the positivist legacy, and an opening to theoretical
reflexivity  would be a mistake.  Rather, i t wil l be suggested that for  two important reasons, the Third Debate 's
contribution to increased reflexivity in the discipline has been limited.  First, a significant number of interventions
in the Third D ebate con tinue  to be  structured in positivist term s (particulary as concerns the tenet of "truth as
correspond ence").  As a co nsequence, the possibilities for the  deve lopm ent of theoretical reflex ivity rem ain ex tremely
limited.  And secondly, of the interventions which do evidence an attempt to break with the positivist legacy, many
have adopted  a form ulation which closes off openings to theoretical reflexivity as effectively as does positivism.
Nonetheless, it will also be argued tha t som e interventions in the  Third Debate do  evidence  a clear b reak w ith
the positivist approach to theorizing, and do so in terms wh ich are conducive to the developm ent of a theoretically
reflexive disposition.  It is these interventions which ho ld out a real hope for the development of thorough-going
theoretical reflexivity in the discipline o f international relations.
Interventions in the Third Debate
On the basis of our discussions of  recen t deve lopm ents in  the philosophy of science in the first part of this
paper, three possible stances with regard  to contending paradigm s can be distinguished.  The first stance,
corresponding to positivist tradition (and in particular, the Lakatosian reformulation of that tradition), is that of
"com mensurable and therefore com parable".  Rival parad igms ("research programmes") are com parab le, asserts this
position, because ultimately they can be assessed according to a comm on standard - that of correspondence to the
real world.  This stance, it will be remem bered, is incompatible with the development of theoretical reflexivity, in
that it sees the standard fo r what constitutes reliable know ledge as "Nature's own", and  thus beyond  criticism.
A second stance  with  regard to  con tending paradigm s is that which corresponds to the Popperian notion of
the "Myth of the Framework".  According to this stance, rival paradigms are "incomm ensurable and therefore
incom parable".  This stance breaks with positivism to the degree that it recognizes that standards for what constitutes
reliable  know ledge are hum an constructs and so cial conventions.  How ever, it shares with positivism the idea that
the acceptance of incommensurability means that rival standards cannot be compared and assessed, thereby closing
itself off to the developm ent of theo retical reflexivity as effectively as does positivism.
Finally, a third stance was identified.  This is the stance associated with the position of Thom as Kuhn,
acco rding to  which rival paradigm s are "incommensurable yet still comparable".  This stance recognizes the social
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nature of the standards for wh at constitu tes "reliab le knowledge".  But it also affirms that these conventions can be
compared and assessed by m eans of reasoned argument and deliberation.  It is this stance which is most conducive
to the developm ent of theoretical reflexivity.
These three stances will be  used  to categorize the interventions in the  Third Debate.  Through this process,
the question of the extent to w hich  the Third D ebate has in  fact contribu ted to  a growth in theoretical reflexivity in
the discip line of international relations will be  addressed .  We will begin with the first stance : that of  "com mensurable
and therefore comparable".
a) Stance I: "Commensurable and Therefore Com parable"
The stance of "co m mensurable and therefore comparable" is, as was noted above, consistent with the
Lakatosian reform ulation  of the  positivist trad ition.  In term s of inte rnation al relations theory's Third D ebate, this
stance has been most consistently adopted by neo-realists.  One of the best examples of this type  of intervention in
the Third D ebate is to be  found in  the writings of K .  J.  Holsti (1985, 1989 ).
 To  begin , there is no question that Holsti is mo st com fortab le with in the  realist - or in h is terms, "Classical" -
tradition.  Indeed, The Dividing Discipline can be seen as a spirited defence of the realist approach to the study of
interna tional politics a t a time when  calls are being heard for its replacem ent.
What is equally significant, however, is Holsti's adherence to a Lakatosian version of positivism, including
the positivist tenet of "truth as correspond ence".  Ho lsti's allegiance to positivism  is clearly ev idenced in his
statem ents co ncerning the purpose  of theory and the  nature of knowledge accumulation .  For Holsti,
the ultim ate pu rpose  of theoretica l activity is to enhance our understanding of the world of
international politics"; it is to "increase our knowledge of the real world by helping to  guide
research and interpret da ta" (1989:255-56, em phasis added).
Moreover, notes Holsti,
W e add  to kno wledge primarily wh en w e render reality more intelligible by seeking generalizations
of empirical validity . . ." (1989:256)
It is out of the understanding that theory is a reflection of the "real world" that Holsti explains the origins
of the  contend ing paradigm s which constitu te the Third D ebate .  "A ple tho ra of  . . .  `parad igms'", notes Holsti, "is
an expression of greater international com plexity" (1989:256).  And because "[o]ur world is complex and growing
more so", he  asserts, "it is  . . .  unlike ly that any single theory o r perspective  . . .  could  adeq uately  expla in all of  its
essential characteristics  . . .  (1989:256).   Thus, he concludes, "Theoretical pluralism is the only possible response
to the  multiple realities of a  com plex w orld" (1989 :256).
It is in the tolerant and  at times alm ost welcoming stance that Holsti takes to paradigm atic pluralism that one
sees clearly the Lakatosian d imension to H olsti's positivism .  For Holsti, parad igmatic plu ralism is more than just an
inevitable condition of theorizing which tries to comprehend a com plex reality.  In keeping with a Lakatosian
orientation, pluralism is an important principle w hich , when respected , serves som e very beneficial fun ctions.  Clearly
echoing Lakatos' rejection of the Popperian notion of strict falsification, Holsti affirms that
Pluralism   . . .  guards against the hazards of "intellectual knockouts," those attem pts to disow n past
methodologies and theories on the assump tion that they are entirely wrong  . . .  This was a major
shortcoming of the m ost extreme beh aviou rism and  of some recen t efforts to  demolish realism and
its variants (1989 :256).
In addition to guarding against straight-forward falsification of paradigms wh ich, despite anomalies, have proven their
worth as interpretive tools, the principle o f pluralism also serves to  insure  that the  discip line keeps p rogressing in its
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     6 No doubt Holsti would share Ball's view that "Lakatos ... provides a means of ` keeping score'
in the contest between rival research programmes" (1987:37). The "means of keeping score"
derives from Lakatos' position that progressive research programmes are successful in the
discovery of new "facts" where degenerating ones are not.
     7 With these remarks, Holsti also demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of Kuhn's position.
Kuhn has never suggested that one theory/ paradigm (eg. pre-Copernican astronomy) is replaced
by a succeeding paradigm because is successor provides a more accurate description of reality.
Indeed, Kuhn's notion of the incommensurability of succeeding paradigms is designed to counter
exactly this conception of linear progress toward an ever more accurate description of the real
world.
     It should be noted, however, that Holsti's adherence to the "linear progress" school of thought
is thoroughly consistent with a Lakatosian position. Asserts Lakatos: "... the methodology of
scientific research programmes is better suited for approximating the truth in our actual universe
than any other methodology" (Chalmers, 1982:104).
quest for ever truer de scriptions of reality.  Thus, notes Holsti, if the dominant realist tradition shows itself to be
inadequate as a description of reality, "then new departures may help us redirect inquiry into the proper channels".
If realism is lacking, argues Holsti, it can be refurbished by "grafting" new  theoretical formulation s onto  it (1985:viii).
It is important to note that desp ite his Lakatosian suppo rt for paradigmatic pluralism, Holsti is not arguing
that all parad igms are of  equal value.  In keep ing with the positivist tenet of "tru th as co rrespondence", parad igms
may be eva lua ted  accord ing to the accuracy of their description of the facts.  No tes Ho lsti, 
Progress is thus not measured by unlimited accumulation of perspectives, paradigms, models, or
methodologies any more than it is by the replacement of "units of knowledge".  Som e perspec tives,
models, and the like sh ould  and do have  higher intellectual claim s than others.  The ultimate test
is how elegantly and comprehensibly they describe and explain the important persisting, new, and
developing realities (1989 :258).6
Thus it is that early in The Dividing Discipline, Holsti affirms that "isomorphism" and "correspondence with the
observed  facts of international politics" are the  standards by wh ich rival paradigm s must be  assessed (1985:v ii).
Indeed, it is on the basis o f its transhistorical co rrespondence with  the fac ts that Holsti con tinues to promote
the realist paradigm  over its rivals.  In an interesting reversal of the  traditional inferio rity ascribed to social scien tists
in comparison with their natural sc ience  counterparts Ho lsti affirms that:
W e cannot throw away paradigms (or what passes for them) as natural scientists do, á la Kuhn,
because the anom alies be tween reality and  its theore tical characterization  are never so severe in
international relations as they are in the natural sciences.  None of the thinkers of the past portrayed
the world of in ternational (or w orld) politics in so  distorted a manner as did the analysts of the
physical or astronomical un iverse prior to the  Copern ican revolu tion (1989 :257).7
From his affirm ations that competing parad igms may be "synthesized" (grafted onto one another), and that
realists have been  more successful than m any physicists in approximating reality - not to mention his assertion that
"correspondence with the observed facts of international politics" is the basis upon which rival paradigm s must be
assessed - it is clear that Holsti does not accept the Kuhnian notion of incomm ensurability.  The implications of the
notion of  the theory-ladenness of a ll "facts" is something he canno t embrace .  Notes Ho lsti,
I remain skeptical of the "liberation  of theory from data", or, as Halliday has put it, a "rejection of
empiricism in favour of a  theoretical approach that accepts the place o f data  in a subord inate
position" (1989 :259).
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     8 Keohane also supports this stance. For his discussion of the merits of a Lakatosian positivist
approach to international politics, see Keohane (1986). Others, who by their call for a "synthesis"
of competing paradigms, despite a nod to the difficulties posed by incommensurability, also seem
to have adopted this stance are Viotti and Kauppi (1987:575-81). See also the discussion of the
relevance of a Lakatosian approach for the study of foreign policy in Herman and Peacock
(1987:22).
     9 "Commensurable and therefore comparable".
The implications of  Holsti's rejection of the no tion of incomm ensurability for increased theoretical
reflexivity  are clear.  In the continued affirmation of the notion that "nature's own" standards - specifically, "truth as
correspondence" - must be applied in the knowledge validation process, the possibility of critical reflection on the
origins and merits of the conventions which define what is to count as reliable knowledge remains remote.
Theoretical reflexivity, to the degree that it figures at all, is reduced to the much m ore limited notion of "careful
examination of assumptions and premises" - a notion that Holsti correctly notes is perfectly consistent with positivism
(1989:255).
In conclusion, it should be noted that a significant number of interventions in the Third Debate - of which
Holsti 's stands out only because of its cla rity - fall into the Lakatosian positivist stance of "comm ensurable and
therefo re com parable".8  As a consequence, the interpretation of the Third Debate as marking a disciplinary shift
toward post-positivist theoretical reflexivity bears being reconsidered.
b) Stance II: "Incommensurable and Therefore Incomparable"
Although  the majority of the in terventions in in ternational relations theory's Third Debate reflect what has
been termed here "Stance I",9 it shou ld be  noted tha t there are  important exceptions.  No teworthy am ong these are
those theorists who have adopted the second stance: that of "incom mensurable and therefore incomparable".
An important intervention by  R. D. McKinlay and R . Little - Global Problems and World Order (1986) - is
a good example of this stance in the Th ird  De ba te.  M cKinlay and Little's starting point is that the source of the
parad igms found in the literature - in their terms, Realism, Liberalism, and  Socialism - is not to be found in
"international com plexity"  (where paradigm atic plu ralism is seen as the inevitab le by-product).  Rather, contending
parad igms are expressions of radically different normative orders embedded  in com peting ideological framew orks.
And, argue McKinlay and Little, with obvious reference to those who have adopted "Stance I", it is the refusal of
those engaged in the Th ird Debate to acknowledge the ideological character of their work that leads them into
"endowing their model with a spurious empirical or scientific validity, which is made all the more striking in contrast
to the  ideology offered  by o ther m ode ls" (198 6:272).
In short, argue M cKinlay and Little, the  con tending paradigm s in international relations theory are
incomm ensurable.  And as a con sequence, the hope held out by the adherents of "Stance I" - that of paradigm
"synthesis" - is a pipedream.  The consequence of incomm ensurability, note McKinlay and Little, is that
 . . .  even when the models [ie.  paradigms] look to the same topics, the general fram ework within
which the topic  is processed leads to systematic  variatio n in  problem exp lica tion  . . .
As a consequence " . . .  as any one model begins to engineer solutions to i ts  perceived problems, i t will in all
likelihood c reate a p roblem for another mode l" (1986:267).
With their rejection of the tenet of "truth as correspondence", as well as the accompanying notion of a theory-
independent realm o f facts by which on e can assess the merits of com peting paradigm s, adherents of "Stance II"
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     10 Rosenau also affirms that temperaments "tend to remain ... fixed and resistant to new
evidence" (p.7), underscoring further the impotence and irrelevance of reasoned argumentation in
the process of paradigm choice.
     11 Once again, McKinlay and Little are not the only authors to adopt such a stance. Rosenau's
support of this position has already been noted.
     Another intervention which would fit into this category is that of Mansbach and Ferguson
(1988). In addition, certain of Gilpin's comments (1987) might also qualify him as at least a part-
time proponent of the stance of "incommensurable and therefore incompatible". For further
discussion of Mansbach, Ferguson, and Gilpin as advocating a form of "radical relativism" in
paradigm assessment, see Keenes (1989:46-48).
appear to be  on the post-positivist path to  theoretical reflexivity.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  It is not the case
because the adheren ts of "Stance  II" equate the  incommensurability of pa radigm s with  that of  the incom parab ility
of paradigm s.  
Again, McKinlay and Little serve as a useful example.  The ability to assess the merits of competing
paradigm s, they argue ,  " . . .  presupposes some form of comp aratively valid evaluation procedure, entailing some
decision rule which would stipulate which mod el was to be retained".  And since any evaluation procedure which
might be proposed would be no mo re than a social convention, and hence, inherently contestable, comparative
assessments are virtually impossible.  The "only com paratively valid test procedure", they conc lude , "is to enquire
whether each model is internally consistent" (1986:269,270).  And this criterion they judge to  be m et in each case.
Indeed, not only is comparative assessment virtually im possible, argu e M cKin lay and Little, bu t the very
idea of meaningful comm unication between the adherents of rival paradigms - and the learning which is a product
of that communication -  is out of the question.  The
sophistication and internal coherence o f each m odel, com bined  with their very differen t goals,
structural arrangements and belief systems, make m eaningful inter-model debate well-nigh
impossible  . . .  Com prom ise and constructive debate can largely only be conducted within the
confines and param eters of  a single m ode l (1986:272-73).
Given the assum ption of the incom parability of parad igms, which forecloses the possibility of providing
reasoned argum ent in  support of one paradigm over another, how is one to account for paradigm  choice by  mem bers
of the research comm unity?
 The position of James Rosenau on this issue is a good example of how Stance II adherents respond to this
question.  In accordance with the core assum ptions of the stance of "incomm ensurable and therefore incomparable",
Rosenau (1982:4) af firms that " . . .the way in w hich  analysts becom e adh erents  of one or another approach is not
necessarily based on intellectual or rational calculation".  What then is  the explanation for paradigm choice? By
definition, the explanation must be found outside the realm of reason and argumentation.  Rosenau's answ er is
consistent, if disconcerting: "our temperaments", he affirms "  . . .  are the central determinants of which approach
we will find  more su itable"  (1982:5).10  
Fortunately, it can be argued that the a-rational - if not, anti-rational - nature of paradigm choice is no t so
much  the logical consequence of incom mensurability as a symptom  of an underlying lim itation of the stance of
"incommensurable and therefore incomparable".  The prob lem  with th is stance, for which the intervention of
McKinlay and Little stands as example,11 is that it has only broken with  the positivist tradition in part.  For while
rejecting the positivist tenet of "truth as correspondence", it remains consistent with the positivism's understanding
of the "C artesian  anxie ty": that only an  ahistorical, extra-social standard can serve to adjudicate between competing
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     12It should be noted that as Bernstein observes with regard to Kuhn, there is a "groping quality"
in the attempts of these scholars "to clarify the characteristics of the type of argumentation that is
involved in choosing among rival paradigms". And, as in the case of Kuhn, it can be argued that
"without being completely aware" of what they are doing, they are "appealing to a conception of
rationality that has been at the core of the tradition of practical philosophy [     12phronesis]".
conceptions of knowledge generation and validation.  As a consequence, the reasoned assessment of the merits of
contending parad igm-specific conventions for what constitutes reliable knowledge - that is, the development of
theoretical reflexivity - is foreclosed.
Fortunately, however, the view that pa radigm s "pass like ships in the night" (McKinlay and Little, 1986:273)
is not the only  alternative to that of positivism 's "com mensurable and therefore comparable".  It is to the third stance -
a stance compatible with the notion of theoretical reflexivity - to which we now turn.
c) Stance III: "Incommensurable Yet Still Comparable"
W e have examined two distinct stances wh ich are  represented  in international relations theory's Third
Debate.  And in each case, we have seen  that the  poss ibilities for the development of theoretical reflex ivity - to the
degree that they exist at all  - are extrem ely lim ited.  There is a third  stance , however, which  does hold  out a  real hope
for the development of theoretical reflexivity.  It is the stance of "incomm ensurable yet still comparable".
Those who adopt this stance share with the adherents of "Stance II" the rejection of the positivist tenet which
defines truth as that which  correspond s to the "rea l world".  They accept that different paradigm s constitute the  world
in different ways, that there is no way to know  the world independen tly of our descriptions of it, and that as a
consequence there is no neutral, context-independent standard by which competing paradigms can be assessed.
Adheren ts of "Stance III" differ from  those  of "Stance  II", however, in their refusa l to equ ate
incommensurability with  incomparab ility.  The fact that no neutral, con text-independent standards exists to assess
competing paradigms does not m ean that hu mans cannot use  their faculty of  reason  in a given context to articu late
standards and to persuade others, by means of argument, of the worth of those standards (even while remaining
cognizant of the fact that new arguments and new contexts may result in a re-examination and revision  of those
standards).  It is just this position which expresses the core of the theoretically reflexive disposition.
While the num bers are  few and  the formulation s rem ain under-developed - and even incon sistent across
different works - it is the conten tion o f this study that some international relations theorists are moving in the
direction of this third stance.  That is, a small but significant number of international relations theorists have begun
to exhibit the "broader and deeper kind of po litical and  epistem ological self-consciousness" (Alker and Biersteker,
1984:138) that is fundamental to  theoretical reflexivity.   They are exhibiting this political and epistemological self-
consciousness by underscoring "the deep connections between the social and political contexts of particu lar
theoretical enterprises and the kind of work actually done" (Alker and Biersteker, 1984:138-39); by recognizing, along
with  critical theorists such as Ho rkheim er, that "What scientists   . . .  regard as the essence of theory  . . .  corresponds,
in fact, to the  immediate  tasks they set for them selves" ; in short, by stressing the indivisible link between the
"epistemological" and the "political" realms, between the question of "how do we know" and visions of the "good
life".12
Stressing the link  betw een the "epistem ological" and the  "political" has important im plications fo r re-
conceptualizing the relationship of paradigms to the world, as well as for the notion of  reliable  knowledge.   Rather
than viewing contending paradigms as different ways of representing the same reality, one can understand them as
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     13 The notion that paradigms represent not different ways of describing the "real world", but
rather different ways of "coping" in the world is central to the work of Richard Rorty. For a good
discussion of Rorty's pragmatism, see West (1989).
     14 The employment of the word "guide" is meant to indicate realism's importance for the
practice of state managers in both a "practical" as well as a "technical/ instrumental" sense. For a
discussion of the distinction between the two senses as manifest in the realist tradition, see Ashley
(1981).
     15 "After all", notes Smith, "if you are not a great power, in Morgenthau's use of the term, what
foreign policy options do you have?" (1987:201).
expressions of different political projects for "coping" in  the world.13  Rather than defining reliable knowledge as
knowledge which accurately represents the "real world" - a definition rendered inapplicable by the recognition of the
constitutive role played by the  "sub ject" in the kno wledge valida tion p rocess - reliable know ledge is understood as
knowledge which proves useful in terms of a specific "coping" agenda.  Accordingly, a paradigm w ill be found to
be "true" - will be judged to produce reliable knowledge - to the extent that it demonstrates its "usefulness" as a guide
to action in terms of the general political vision in which  it is embedded  and  of the  concrete political project to which
it is d irec ted .  
The case o f the rea list parad igm in international relations theory serves as a good example.  In terms of the
perspective being advanced  here, the success of realism has, pace Holsti, had less  to do  with  its alleged accuracy in
grasping the "facts" of interna tional politics, than with its demonstrated u tility for guiding state m anagers in their
activities of "state- and  nation-bu ilding" (K eenes, 198 9:65 ).  That is to  say, the rea list parad igm has va lidated  its truth-
claim s by dem onstrating its ability to guide state policy-m aking;14 realism is "true" because it has met the needs of
the policy-makers of the great powers - most recently and perhaps m ost imp ortantly, the United  States -  engaged in
the pursu it of a specific agenda and faced "with a specific set of foreign policy problems" (Smith, 1987:197).  As
Smith has argued, because international relations theory, as primarily an "American discipline", has been:
 . . .  so closely identified with the foreign policy concerns of the country, it is not surprising that
the assumptions of Realism have proven to be so difficult to overcome.  This is because the focus
of Realism, namely how to maximize power so as to manage inte rnational even ts, fits
extraordinarily well with the needs o f a  hegemonic power.  The three key e lements of R ealism 's
account of world politics, the national interest, power maxim ization and the balance of po wer, are
particu larly we ll-suited to  the requirem ents o f a fore ign po licy for the U.S. (1987:198-99).
If the success  of the  realist paradigm  cann ot be  understood apart from  particu lar socia l actors and their
political projec ts - specifically U.S. state m anagers ded icated  to the m aintenance of A merican  hegem ony - then a
sim ilar rela tionship  must ho ld for o ther paradigm s.  Notes Sm ith, 
Just as it has been argued  . . .  that the US policy agenda dom inated the study of international
relations by dom inating Realism w ithin the US, so we should expect different paradigms [ie.
plura lism and  structura lism] to appeal to persons in d ifferent settings (1987:202).15  
Alker and Biersteker concur:
Two global superpowers both able to destroy each other, but likely to self-destruct in the same
process, are likely to have scholars especially interested in "global interdependence" or "peaceful
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     16 For Alker and Biersteker's efforts to link contending paradigms to particular political
agendas, see (1984:138), Figure 4.
coexistence"  . . .  Anti-colonial revolutionaries in relatively underdeveloped countries are driven
by o ther practical im peratives (1984:139).16
The conceptualization of competing paradigms as expressions of general political visions and corresponding
to concrete political projects is vital to the stance of comparing the incom mensurable in international relations theory.
It is vital in that it provides a way of assessing contending paradigms which is not bound to the notion of "truth as
correspondence", but which is also capable of going beyond a-rational "temperament" as the justification for
parad igm preference.  By linking the "epistemological" and the "political", it becomes possible to assess rival
parad igm-specific knowledge-defining standards in  terms of the relative m erits of the  politica l visions/ projec ts in
which the paradigm s are em bedded .  In short, a m eans for rationally comparing incommensurable paradigm s in
international relations theory is possible once it is recognized that the question of  "wh ich paradigm  is superior?" can
be restated as "which genera l politica l vision/ concrete po litical project is most appropriate to the  global polis?"; once
it is recognized that at the meta-theoretical level, the question of "what is reliable knowledge?" can be reformulated
as "how should we live?" 
This recogn ition is  imperative in  the  discip line of international rela tions.  Give n that paradigm s valida te
themselves in terms of both social actors and specific purposes, the question of social identity and political purpose
can no longer be avoided by  those  who comprise the  com munity  of international relations scholars.  For if it is true
that at the level of scholarship, "[paradigms] compete by virtue of the accounts they provide in  expla ining what we
as scholars  . . .  define as central to our purpose, enquiry, ideology" (Smith, 1987:202, emphasis added), then the
need to compare incommensurable paradigms directs us to a broader debate about which "purposes", which
"enqu iries" and which "ideologies" merit the support and energy  of inte rna tional rela tions scholars.  If it is true that,
in the words of Fichte, "the choice between comprehensive theories rests on one's interests entirely" (Feyerabend,
197 5:128), then  the nature o f the in terests with which  interna tional relations scholars identify themselves must be
considered .  
To acknowledge the link between the "epistemological" and the "political" is to recognize that participating
in the "normal science" tradition of any paradigm means - consciously or not - lending support to a specific political
project; it is to  accept that to en gage in  paradigm-directed puzzle-solving is - in tentionally o r not - to  direct one's
energies to the e stablishm ent and m aintenance of a  specific global orde r.  As a consequence, it becom es vital to
engage in a critical examination of the relative merits of rival political projects and of contending global orders.  For
once it is recognized that the knowledge-defining standards that we adopt are not neutral, but have an undeniab le
political content, then it becomes imperative to "bring politics back in" (Keenes, 19 89) - open ly and  explic itly - to
our deliberations on the  character of reliable knowledge of interna tional politics.
It should  be em phasized  that it would  be a m istake to view the  stress on the indivisible link between the
"epistemological" and the "political" as marking the end  of rational assessm ent of knowledge claim s.  It is of course
true, that in the assessment of contending political projects and global orders there is no neutral, context-independent
standard to guide us.  Even so, the tradition of phronesis - of practical reason - affirms that meaningful debate about
the merits of contending political visions is possible; that human reason can be employed to judge wisely and
hum anely.  At the  very least the  attem pt is worth making.  Fo r in a context in  which the dominant politica l projec ts
of the past hav e brought our global polis  to the brink of annihilation, a reasoned discussion and theoretically self-
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     17 As is evidenced by the recent discussion in the  International Studies Quarterly concerning
the significance of the "Third Debate" (Lapid, 1989; Holsti, 1989; Biersteker, 1989; George,
1989).
conscious assessment of the relative merits of the political projects and global orders represented by the contending
parad igms of internation al politics is essential.  In short, theoretica l reflexivity can no longer be viewed as a frill that
the d iscipline  can a fford to do  without.
Conclusion
This paper began with  the question of  the prospects for the development of theoretically reflexive theory in
the discipline of international relations.  First, the issue of theoretical reflexivity was related both to the predominance
of positivism in the social sciences (including that of international relations theory), and to the challenging of
positivism - and in particular, the tenet of "truth as correspondence" - by post-positivist philosophy of science.  It is
this challenging of positivism which has given rise to the "reflexive turn" in contemporary social and political theory.
The question o f whether a  parallel to the "reflexive turn"  in soc ial and  politica l theory can  be identified  in
theorizing about international relations was then addressed.  It has been argued in this paper that the questions central
to theoretical reflexivity have begun to make inroads from the margins into the centre of contemporary theorizing
about international po litics.17  Specifically, in the context of international relations theory's Third D ebate - and  desp ite
the continuing predominance of non-reflexive interventions - one sees evidence of the growth of the "broader and
deeper kind of po litical and  epistem ological self-consciousness" wh ich is fundamental to the developmen t of a
theoretically reflexive disposition.  As a consequence, if it remains premature to speak of an authentic "reflexive turn"
in the discipline of international relations, it can nonetheless be argued that the prospects for the growth of
theoretically reflexive international relations theory are real and significan t.  If true, this is indeed fo rtunate.  For it
cannot be denied that the need for theoretical reflexivity in the study of international relations - and the explicit
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